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Concession Bargaining
An Experimental Comparison of Protocols and Time Horizons
Abstract
We test experimentally whether dynamic interaction is crucial for concession
bargaining. In our complete information bargaining experiments, two parties with
asymmetric conflict payoffs try to agree how to share a commonly known pie by bar-
gaining over a finite number of successive trials (agreement attempts). We compare
the fully dynamic interaction to one less dynamic and one static protocol. In the
quasi-dynamic protocol, later trials merely reveal that so far no agreement has been
reached, and in the static protocol no feedback information is given about earlier
trials. We find that neither conflict rate nor efficiency or inequality of agreements
differ across protocols. Comparing different numbers of maximal trials shows that
more trials render conflict more likely due to less concessions.
Keywords: concession bargaining, dynamic interaction, emotions, deadline, con-
flict, experiment.
JEL-Codes: C72, C78.
1 Introduction
Negotiations often unfold in time and are characterized by gradual concessions. When
a party concedes this means that this party would now accept agreements that it so far
would have rejected. Thus concessions try to prevent conflict in negotiations. Especially
when conceding unfolds dynamically, parties may develop more realistic ideas of what
others are willing to concede and moderate their own demands.
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Concession bargaining has already been theoretically analyzed by Zeuthen (1930),
where prediction is closely related to the bargaining solution proposed by Nash (1950,
1953), as shown by Harsanyi (1956). However, the so-called Nash-bargaining solution
appeals neither to time nor to concession-making.1 Other approaches to bargaining, e.g.
Rubinstein (1982), rely on alternating offers in bargaining, but impose restrictions with
profound consequences for the equilibrium outcome.2 This introduces our main research
question: does it behaviorally matter whether concession-making is allowed to unfold in
time? In trying to answer this question, we do not impose alternation but rather allow
for independent choices along the way. This raises another question:3 does this naturally
lead to alternation in conceding? Then we ask: does behavior change when we restrict
feedback about earlier failed agreement attempts although such restrictions do not affect
the strategic incentives?
Except for dynamic games, whose state variables determine the rules for future choice
making, what matters strategically is how choices can be conditioned. Now conditioning
choices as in sequential bargaining games are adequately captured by the normal form
representation of such games. Thus, conditioning behavior can be studied experimentally
by comparing the “cold” strategy method with the “hot” sequential play method (see, for
example, Brandts and Charness, 2011, or the final section of Fischer and Gu¨th, 2012).
The strategy method is a convenient experimental method delivering more informative
choice data but is also used in the field, e.g. when negotiating via delegates instructed by
strategies specifying each imaginable contingency of how to behave (for an early study
of bargaining through delegates, see Schotter et al., 2000). Such bargaining by delegates
may be partly substituted by online negotiations, which render the bargaining process
less influenced by emotions and tactics, e.g. those shaping concession-making.
However, the normal form of a truly dynamic negotiation can become excessively
complex since strategy spaces grow exponentially in the number of available attempts
for finding an agreement. We therefore only compare the truly dynamic game to versions
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in which timing is not important or reduced to mere conditioning. More specifically, we
distinguish three bargaining protocols:
• Dynamically unfolding concession-making with feedback information about pre-
vious attempts via informing about the earlier demands by the other party –
described as “hot” due to possible strong emotional arousal when one party learns
that the other party did not concede at all or only insufficiently, e.g. compared to
the own former concession. Such emotional arousal may cause higher demand or
lower concession levels in subsequent trials.
• Quasi-dynamic interaction maintaining an awareness that earlier agreement at-
tempts have failed without, however, informing about the earlier demands by the
other party – one can only infer that the other party’s demand exceeds what is
left after subtracting one’s own demand. Thus, one is keenly aware, as in the fully
dynamic protocol, of not yet having agreed – this protocol is described as “quasi-
hot” as a party might experience some emotional arousal after learning that all
previous agreement attempts have failed.
• Static interaction where parties, in the spirit of normal form bargaining games,
choose independently complete behavioral plans prescribing, for any possible con-
stellation in the course of concession bargaining, how much to concede. As a
consequence, parties must imagine all possible cases of earlier failures in reaching
an agreement, i.e. all concessions are made not knowing whether or not they will
be needed – for this reason, this protocol is characterised as “cold”.
Although we compare “hot” play versus “cold” strategy method only the latter two
protocols capture the same game. The first presents a richer game allowing for con-
ditioning not only on earlier failures but also on the actual demands leading to them
and capturing the true dynamics and triggering possibly strong emotional and nervous
arousal during the negotiation process. Moving from the dynamic to the static proto-
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col we gradually eliminate crucial aspects of dynamic bargaining in order to assess how
relevant the negotiation dynamics are.
Recently Grimm and Mengel (2011) raised interest in the influence of emotions on
negotiations. Building on Bosman et al. (2001), who showed that (self-reported) emo-
tions strongly correlate with acceptance of ultimatum offers, Grimm and Mengel find
that enforcing a break of about ten minutes before deciding whether (or not) to accept
an ultimatum offer suffices to increase acceptance of low offers. Oechssler et al. (2015)
make a similar observation in one of their treatments. Related evidence comes from
research exploring the relevance of anger, as for example in Zizzo (2004, 2008). Sur-
prisingly, the literature comparing ultimatum bargaining behavior of “hot” play and
“cold” strategy choice, either finds no difference or that the strategy method strengthen
fairness concerns (see Fischer and Gu¨th, 2012).
Specifically, for the three protocols we expected the following effects: As quasi-
dynamic interaction is more prone to emotional arousal than the static one, we pre-
dicted more conflict in the former. The truly dynamic interaction should trigger the
strongest emotional arousa but also the best chances of successful coordination, e.g. as
measured by lower efficiency due to anticonflict.4 Due to better coordination, efficiency
of agreements is likely to be higher in the dynamic than in the other two protocols.5 We
expected this effect to be stronger when finding an agreement at later trials. To explore
this issue, we compared a short and a long deadline, the latter allowing for twice as many
concessions before the deadline. While we expected emotions to remain unaffected by
the time horizon, we predicted better coordinated demands, especially in the dynamic
protocol.
Contrary to our expectations, crucial outcome characteristics like conflict ratio, ef-
ficiency and inequality of agreements do not depend on protocol. In our view, this is
comforting for institutional design of bargaining and negotiation rules. Committees do
not have to meet and reconvene frequently in order to reach an agreement via concession
4
making, at least in situations of complete information.6 However, the time horizon affects
the rate of conflict across protocols: the rate of conflict rises with the longer deadline.
All protocols rely on the strategic or ( ‘non-cooperative’) bargaining approach. As
such they differ substantially from the early characteristic function bargaining experi-
ments (see e.g. Sauermann, 1967) and the more recent ones of unstructured bargaining
(see e.g. Anbarci and Feltovich, 2013, 2014). Whereas strategic bargaining appeals to
methodological individualism – one tries to explain bargaining by individual choice be-
havior – the other traditions seem to suggest that subtle details are often unspecified
in field settings. But there exist also field situations such as international negotiations
on army control and environmental issues where detailed protocols are clearly specified
before actually making concessions. In collective wage bargaining (e.g. Levinson, 1966)
the more centralised negotiations as in Europe rely on stricter protocols than firm-level
ones in the US (see Du Caju et al., 2008). Altogether none of the approaches is superior.
Whereas less structured protocols often offer convenient shortcuts to find out stylized
outcome effects, studies like ours focus on a detailed analysis of specific procedural details
like who will concede when and how much. What we explore is nevertheless a crucial
aspect of nearly all field cases, namely how to avoid an impasse when initial demands
are too ambitious and when an agreement requires conceding.
Concessions in the spirit of the analysis by Zeuthen (1930) have also been experimen-
tally explored by Bolton and Karago¨zog˘lu (2016). They analyze the influence of relative
performance of players in a real effort task on initial demands and the subsequent de-
mand levels. Instead of an asymmetry induced by differences in relative performance,
we impose exogenously asymmetric conflict payoffs.
The related study by Felli et al. (forthcoming) also captures concession-making in
bilateral bargaining and also varies the maximal number of concessions. However, there
are three major differences:
(a) whereas Felli et al. only use the strategy method, our study explores also dynamic
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bargaining via two additional protocols but with less focus on experience;
(b) Felli et al. implement ultimatum bargaining meaning that the responder de-
termines only the range of acceptable offers and that the proposer is the residual
claimant,7
(c) the demand game (see Nash, 1953), on which our study is based, does not rely on
such different roles – in our setup both parties collect their agreement demands.
Instead we analyze asymmetry via exogenously given asymmetric conflict payoffs.
Since we investigate two sequential protocols (one where one concedes being aware
that the earlier attempts have failed and one where one knows all the failed past pro-
posals), we can assess whether and how conceding in the light of failed past agreements
matters. By (a) we thus also contribute to the fundamental debate in game theory
whether the normal form of a game captures all strategically relevant aspects what
game-theoretically justifies using the strategy method (see Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944 and more recently Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986).
The importance of aspect (b) can be illustrated by an equilibrium analysis of both
games, the demand game and the ultimatum game.8 The former is characterized by a
typically large multiplicity of strict equilibria (unilateral deviations from such equilibria
result in a loss) whereas the equilibria of the ultimatum game are weak (the responder’s
payoff only changes when accepting or rejecting the actual offer but not when reacting
to other offers). Solving the demand game uniquely requires a theory of equilibrium
selection (see Nash, 1950, and more generally Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) whereas the
ultimatum game can be solved by once repeated elimination of weakly dominated strate-
gies. Finally agreeing to share less than available, i.e. the so-called anticonflict as an
off-equilibrium phenomenon, is excluded by the ultimatum game.
Asymmetric conflict payoffs allow to assess whether parties, for example when sharing
equally, rely on the agreement surplus (the pie minus the conflict payoffs) or the pie,
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e.g. when considering individual conflict payoffs as purely counterfactual and therefore
negligible opportunities. For the answer it may matter which bargaining protocol one
implements. Altogether there is a story overlap in the general research topic of both
studies, namely concession-making, and partly in the elicitation method (see also the
comparison of specific results in Felli et al., forthcoming). On the other hand, the specific
hypotheses to be tested experimentally, differ considerably due to the very different
bargaining rules and protocols. Both studies together hopefully allow a more reliable
assessment of concession-making in bilateral bargaining.
2 The bilateral bargaining problem and the protocols
Two parties or players 1 and 2 can divide 650 points, convertible to money at a known
exchange rate, with commonly known conflict payoffs of 175 points for one player and
25 for the other. In all protocols bargaining is based on hierarchically ordered demands
dti in the sense of d
t+1
i ≤ dti for i = 1, 2. If dt+1i < dti, i.e. if the demand decreases
from trial t to t+ 1, we speak of a concession k by player i in trial t+ 1 of size kt+1i =
dti − dt+1i . Correspondingly, whenever dt+1i = dti, player i does not concede. If neither
party concedes, bargaining ends in conflict – see Felli et al. (forthcoming) for a study
comparing this rule of ending the game with one ruling out early conflict before reaching
the deadline or maximum number of trials T .
The intuition of such rule is that when neither party concedes in situations of well
prepared bargaining behavior such as, for instance, among nations as in collective wage
bargaining, there seems to be no mutually satisfactory agreement, that discourages any
further agreement attempts. In our view, continuing to negotiate after no concession is
more typical of bazar-like bargaining situations rather than of well planned negotiations
where each further trial is usually rather costly.
What we compare for all three protocols, is the number of trials t = 1, · · · , T , specif-
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ically T = 3 and T = 5. In case of T = 3 there can be at most two concessions, in case
of T = 5 at most four.
In the static protocol S players i = 1, 2 determine their demand vectors
di =
(
d1i , d
2
i , · · · , dTi
)
with dt+1i ≤ dti for all t < T
independently and simultaneously before play. If for all τ < t it holds that dτ1 +d
τ
2 > 650
but dτ+1i < d
τ
i for at least one player i = 1, 2, an agreement is reached in trial t when
dt1 +d
t
2 ≤ 650 with each player receiving what he demanded.9 If, however, dT1 +dT2 > 650
or, in case of t < T , dt+11 = d
t
1 and d
t+1
2 = d
t
2 (i.e. no concession from either party)
bargaining ends with conflict and players receive their respective conflict payoff ci.
If at any time a pair reached trial t but is unable to agree at t, there will only be a
later agreement attempt at t+ 1 if at least one player i = 1, 2 made an at least minimal
concession (dti < d
t+1
i ). To avoid trivial concessions which are too small to qualify as
a significant sacrifice, we required minimal concessions of 25 points, a prominent but
significant share, about 3.85%, of the available pie.
We experimentally enforce Zeuthen’s (1930) model of concession bargaining which
appeals to a gradual process, where at each trial either at least one party makes a
concession, accepts the terms offered by the other party or quits. Such concessions are
not only attempts to align total demand with what is available but also necessary for
preventing “early” conflict.
Another aspect concerns anti-conflict, i.e. agreement in trials i = 1, 2, · · · , T with
dti+d
t
2 < 650. This never occurs in equilibrium. Here, we simply assume that 650−dt1−dt2
is lost for the two interacting parties.
The quasi-dynamic or positional-order protocol P is identical to protocol S in
terms the game structure and the minimal concession. The only difference relates to
information on the outcome of previous attempts to reach an agreement. In protocol S,
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players i = 1, 2 do not know when stating dt+1i that earlier attempts have failed (but are
aware that such demands only matter when previous attempts have failed), whereas in
protocol P they know this. Thus, protocol P differs from protocol S by asking for later
demands only when they are needed. More specifically, demand dt+1i is only elicited from
i when there is no “earlier” agreement or conflict due to no concession on both sides, i.e.
dτ1 + d
τ
2 > 650 and d
τ
1 + d
τ
2 < d
τ−1
1 + d
τ−1
2 for all τ < t. In other words: the comparison
of protocol S and P confronts the “cold” strategy method (protocol S) with the (quasi-)
“hot” sequential method in a richer setting than usual. Strategically, the two protocols
implement the same game.
The third, truly dynamic protocol D, represents a different and richer game, al-
lowing for all sorts of path dependency like alternating in concession-making, reciprocity
in sizing one’s concession, etc. The amount of minimal concessions is the same as in
protocols S and P. As in protocol P players i = 1, 2 only have to choose dt+1i in trial
t+ 1 in case of no earlier agreement. However, unlike in protocol P, players i = 1, 2 also
know all earlier demands dτ1 , d
τ
2 for τ ≤ t and why they led to another trial in t+1. This
allows for stronger emotional arousal but at the same time also for better coordination
than in the other protocols.
Altogether we rely on a 2 × 3 factorial design, T = 3 versus T = 5 as well as
protocols S, P, and D. All six treatments have a large multiplicity of strict agreement
equilibria whose agreement demands
(
dt
∗
1 , d
t∗
2
)
satisfy dt
∗
1 +d
t∗
2 = 650 and with i’s demand
exceeding the conflict payoff ci of player i = 1, 2. To select among the efficient equilibria
one can rely on the bargaining solution of Nash (1950, 1953) predicting
dti = ci +
650− 200
2
= ci + 225
for ci ∈ {25, 175}. Another relevant focal point, in addition to the Nash bargaining
solution payoffs of 250 and 400 with equal agreement dividends of 225, is the equal split
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with 325 each, which leads to very unequal agreement dividends.
Based on existing experimental evidence (Fischer et al., 2007; Anbarci and Feltovich,
2013) we expect the vast majority of agreements to lie between these two benchmarks.
Despite D differing from S and P, incentives are identical. The only difference is that
D has a considerably larger space of conditional strategies. Overall, while theoretically
there should be no effect of protocol and maximal number of concession attempts, due
to emotional arousal, behaviorally it should matter.
There also exists a multiplicity of inefficient conflict equilibria, with both parties
offering the other at most its conflict payoff. However, related experimental evidence,
such as in Fischer et al. (2007) and Anbarci and Feltovich (2013) suggest that this is of
only little behavioral relevance as one usually will strive for an agreement.
3 Experiment
The experiment has a 3× 2 design: we have explored the protocols S, P, and D between
subjects, and T ∈ {3, 5} within subjects but with the order “T = 3 first, T = 5 second”
or “3→5”, respectively reversed as “5→3”, implemented between subjects.10 For each
treatment out of six, we ran three sessions with two matching groups of eight participants
each. We therefore have observations from a total of 288 participants, with twelve
independent matching groups per combination of protocol with T . For example, for
combination S and T = 3 we have six independent matching groups from S3→5 and
another six from S5→3.
Instructions were read aloud to provide common knowledge of the rules of the game,
e.g. of the asymmetry in conflict payoffs (see online appendix A). After that participants
had to answer control questions concerning the rules of the game, including the effect of
neither party making a concession (see online appendix B).
Within each session we once repeated both treatment combinations in order to check
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for effects of experience in some minimal way.11 More specifically, participants in Sessions
S of 3→5 first played two rounds of protocol S with T = 3, followed by two rounds of
protocol S with T = 5. Rematching between rounds used a stranger design.12 Through-
out a session a participant kept the same conflict payoff ci and the outcome of every
round was paid.
All sessions were conducted in the experimental laboratory of [name of institution
removed]. Recruitment was among students at the two local universities and relied on
ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), the experimental software relied on zTree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Online appendix D contains the screenshots of the experiment. On average sessions
lasted for 50 minutes including admission and payment. Participants earned on average
16.44e, including a show up fee of 5e.13
Of the 288 participants about 51.7% were female, and average age was 24 years (min.
19, max. 34). Everyone either was a student or had just finished university. Only 2.8%
were students of economics.14 With respect to these and other (self-reported) socio-
demographic characteristics there were no differences between protocols.15 We therefore
did not fall victim to an unfortunate sample selection.
4 Main findings
With respect to the most crucial outcome variables like frequency of conflict, efficiency
of agreement as measured by the sum of agreement demands and the (in)equality of
agreement dividends, invariance applies to all three protocols.
Result 1: For each horizon T individually, and for both combined, the protocol (S,
P, or D) does not significantly affect frequency of conflict, efficiency or (in)equality of
agreements.
Note we measure inequality as the difference in the payoff of the subject with c = 175
minus that of the participant with c = 25. Qualitatively results do not change if we use
11
the absolute value of the difference.
Figure 1 shows the distributions of these variables separately for every combination
of protocol and T . Table 1 illustrates the results of rank-sum tests, based on the dis-
tributions of averages over all rounds per independent matching group. Despite, for
example, there being higher efficiency of agreements in D compared to S and P when
T = 3, all differences between protocols are insignificant. Since we perform three pairs
of protocol comparisons, we rely on the acceptance thresholds adjusted according to a
5% false discovery rate criteria of Benjamini and Hochberg (1995).16
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Figure 1: Agreement ratio, efficiency and inequality by protocol and time horizon T
Notes: Efficiency and inequality are defined as (dt25+d
t
175)/650 and d
t
175−dt25 respectively
when agreement is reached at trial t. Each observation is the mean value at the group
level.
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Table 1: Rank-sum tests on agreement ratio, efficiency and inequality by protocol
Agreement Ratio
T = 3 T = 5 Combined
Protocol (N) Mean P D Mean P D Mean P D
S (12) 0.9271 0.5689 0.9490 0.8021 0.4123 0.4600 0.8646 0.6343 0.3599
P (12) 0.8958 0.6610 0.875 0.0722 0.8854 0.1206
D (12) 0.9063 p-value ranksum test 0.75 p-value ranksum test 0.8281 p-value ranksum test
Efficiency |Agreement
T = 3 T = 5 Combined
Protocol (N) Mean P D Mean P D Mean P D
S (12) 0.9688 0.7947 0.1056 0.9806 0.1933 0.3842 0.9746 0.2854 0.9310
P (12) 0.9652 0.1056 0.9747 0.7073 0.9697 0.6649
D (12) 0.9787 p-value ranksum test 0.9751 p-value ranksum test 0.9758 p-value ranksum test
Inequality |Agreement
T = 3 T = 5 Combined
Protocol (N) Mean P D Mean P D Mean P D
S (12) 12.26 0.2985 0.6860 4.56 0.0781 0.8397 9.02 0.0833 0.4024
P (12) 22.38 0.5441 28.99 0.2253 26.05 0.4356
D (12) 20.11 p-value ranksum test 12.5 p-value ranksum test 17.61 p-value ranksum test
Notes: p-values are two-sided. Each observation is the mean value at the group level.
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We ran further robustness tests, which all confirm this null-result. We qualitatively
observe identical results if we only look at data (a) from the first two rounds, (b) the last
two rounds, (c) the first and third round, (d) the second and fourth round. The same
holds for independent first round data per bargaining pair. According to Kruskal-Wallis
tests the distributions of agreed payoffs in the first round do not differ across protocols.
Parametric methods (controlling for the panel structure) also confirm our results (see
Table E.1 of online appendix).
Thus, conjectures of higher agreement rate in S rather than P due to emotional
arousal and the higher efficiency in D than in S and P (especially when T = 5) are not
confirmed. As expected, the level of inequality for most agreeing pairs lies between 0 and
150, however values of or near 0 are frequent. Remember that the expected difference
between payoffs is 0 for an equal split and 150 for the mid-point (Nash) prediction.
Overall, the equal split is considerably more focal than the Nash bargaining solution.
This outcome seems focal also in so-called ‘unstructured bargaining’ (see Anbarci and
Feltovich, 2013, 2014).
Protocol effects are unobserved, but how about the number of possible concessions
(T = 3 versus T = 5)? Actually, here we find a significant effect for one of the outcome
variables, namely the frequency of conflict.
Result 2: The frequency of conflict increases with time horizon, T .
With the combined data, the difference in the rate of agreement is significant (two-
sided p = 0.0076 with the sign-ranked test and p < 0.01 for the dummy variable of
T = 5 with the logit regression; see Table 2 and the third column of Table E.1 of online
appendix. The corresponding box-plot graphs are provided with Figure E.1), though
the differences are insignificant for each protocol individually.
Surprisingly, efficiency of agreements does not significantly change with the number
of available trials T .
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Table 2: Sign-rank tests on agreement ratio, efficiency and inequality by time horizon T
Agreement Ratio Efficiency |Agreement
Mean p-value Mean p-value
Protocol (N) T = 3 T = 5 signrank T = 3 T = 5 signrank
S (12) 0.9271 0.8021 0.0902 0.9688 0.9806 0.1361
P (12) 0.8958 0.8750 0.3416 0.9652 0.9747 0.2393
D (12) 0.9063 0.7500 0.0523 0.9787 0.9751 0.5561
Combined (36) 0.9097 0.8090 0.0076 0.9709 0.9768 0.1817
Inequality |Agreement
Mean p-value
Protocol (N) T = 3 T = 5 signrank
S (12) 12.26 4.56 0.5303
P (12) 22.38 28.99 0.9375
D (12) 20.11 12.50 0.6379
Combined (36) 18.25 15.35 0.5043
Notes: p-values are two-sided. Each observation is at the mean at the group level.
Result 3: Efficiency of agreements does not increase significantly with time horizon.
Whereas Result 1 was expected, Results 2 and 3 are surprising. A longer horizon
allows obviously for more attempts to find an agreement, and to fine-tune an agreement
by trying to render it more efficient. The contrary effects stated by Results 2 and 3
could be due to more emotional arousal when concessions can unfold more over time. A
more detailed analysis of the data might help to clarify this.
5 Detailed analysis of behavior
5.1 Different endpoints of the bargaining process
Given the invariance of bargaining protocol, are there any differences in the bargaining
process, which average out over the entire game? First we check whether there are
different reasons for ending up with conflict or different kinds of agreements across
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protocols and horizon T . There are four possible outcomes: (a) efficient agreement,
(b) anti-conflict agreement, (c) conflict due to no concessions and (d) conflict due to
insufficient concessions. An agreement is efficient when dt1 + d
t
2 = 650 and there is anti-
conflict agreement if dt1 + d
t
2 < 650. Conflict due to no concessions occurs when at one
point both players refuse to concede. Conflict due to insufficient concessions arises when
the pair was unable to reach an agreement up to deadline T .17
Figure 2 shows the cumulative incidence of the four outcomes for each protocol and
T over trial.18 The mean values reported in Table 3 are the relative frequencies of the
four outcomes when the game ends, thus they correspond the bars for t = T in Figure
2. With an acceptance threshold adjusted according to the false discovery rate of 5% we
find no significant difference between protocols in any of the final outcomes. Without
adjustment, i.e. at a 5% threshold, the results of the Wilcoxon sign-rank test for anti-
conflict agreement ratios show a significantly higher result in P than in S (p = 0.0463,
two-sided) and in P than in D (p = 0.0392, two-sided) when T = 5. However, these p-
values are no longer significant if the thresholds are adjusted for the multiple-comparison
test: 0.0463 > 0.05 · 23 and 0.0392 > 0.05 · 13 .
If we compare ratios of outcomes between T = 3 and T = 5 in each protocol, we
observe a consistently higher ratio of anti-conflict agreement, a lower ratio of conflict due
to no concession and a higher ratio of conflict due to insufficient concessions when T = 3.
As Table 3 indicates, some of the differences are statistically significant at the adjusted
acceptance threshold. Even if we pool the data from all protocols, the differences in
anti-conflict agreements and conflict due to insufficient concessions are significant. It
seems that pure anticipation of only two rather than four concessions triggers attempts
of either being tough by making no or little concession or avoiding to learn what the
other party requires minimally. On the other hand, there is no significant difference in
efficient agreements between T = 3 and T = 5. Thus, the drop in agreement rate when
T = 5, observed in Result 2, is primarily a drop in anti-conflict agreements, which is
16
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accompanied by an increase in no-concession conflicts.
Table 3: Sign-rank tests on efficient agreement, anti-conflict agreement, no concession
conflict and insufficient concession conflict by time horizon T
Rate of Efficient Agreements Rate of Anti-Conflict Agreements
Mean
(N)
p-value Mean
(N)
p-value
Protocol T = 3 T = 5 signrank T = 3 T = 5 signrank
S 0.5000 0.5833 (12) 0.2039 0.4271 0.2188 (12) 0.0141
P 0.4375 0.4896 (12) 0.4503 0.4583 0.3854 (12) 0.4067
D 0.5729 0.5313 (12) 0.3808 0.3333 0.2188 (12) 0.0864
Combined 0.5035 0.5347 (36) 0.4541 0.4063 0.2743 (36) 0.0062
Rate of No Concession Conflict Rate of Insufficient Concession Conf.
Mean
(N)
p-value Mean
(N)
p-value
Protocol T = 3 T = 5 signrank T = 3 T = 5 signrank
S 0.0104 0.1667 (12) 0.0095 0.0625 0.0313 (12) 0.1797
P 0.0521 0.1250 (12) 0.0519 0.0521 0.0000 (12) 0.0462
D 0.0521 0.2396 (12) 0.0137 0.0417 0.0104 (12) 0.2965
Combined 0.0382 0.1771 (36) 0.0001 0.0521 0.0139 (36) 0.0116
Notes: p-values are two-sided. Each observation is the mean at the group level.
To check whether this increase in no-concession conflicts is a mere consequence of
increased opportunity, we looked at the evolution of outcomes as illustrated in Figure 2.
The patterns over time look very similar for the three protocols, which confirms Result
1 of no effect of protocol. With respect to early break up, for T = 5 the likelihood of a
pair breaking up early is already large at Trials 2 and 3. Thus, it appears that a larger
time horizon renders participants more stubborn.
We therefore compared the likelihood that a player refuses to concede. The first and
second columns of Table 4 report the results of logit models in which, in a trial t > 1,
the dependent variable is one if the player’s current demand level is the same with that
in the previous trial, otherwise zero. The explanatory variables are a dummy for time
horizon (T = 5), dummies for protocols P and D, number of trials, dummies for cases
where the previous demand was 325 points and between 326 and 350 points, order of
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play, and round number. Regression (1) is for players with low conflict payoff and (2)
for high conflict payoff players. As for Protocol S, we use observations when the player
is still bargaining in order to be consistent with the data of other protocols.
The dummy variable T = 5 is significantly positive for both Regressions (1) and (2),
hence players are less likely to concede in case of T = 5, irrespective of conflict payoff.19
Result 4: The increase in time horizon makes both types of players less likely to
concede and increases the chance of an early break up.
We also find that
(a) for low conflict payoff players, conceding is more likely when players only know that
they are still bargaining as shown by the significantly negative dummy variable for
protocol P;
(b) both players are neither more nor less likely to stop conceding as the number of
trials increases;
(c) both players tend to stop conceding at 325, the equal split demand;
(d) only high conflict payoff players stop conceding at a level slightly higher than 325,
specifically between 326 and 350;20
(e) high conflict payoff players are less likely to stop conceding in the treatment 5→3;
(g) high conflict payoff players are more likely to stop conceding as the number of
rounds increases.
5.2 Concession levels and demand levels
We also checked the concession sizes of both types of players. We define a concession
kt as we did in Section 2. While 32.9% of all decisions made from the second trial
onward (and before finishing bargaining for Protocol S) are “no concession”, the rate of
19
Table 4: Logistic regressions on “no concession” and linear regressions on “concession
size”
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
No concession Concession kti | kti > 0
Variables ci = 25 ci = 175 ci = 25 ci = 175
T = 5 0.754*** 0.747*** -6.646*** -15.04***
(0.218) (0.226) (2.092) (2.813)
Protocol P -0.847** -0.277 -6.712* -12.82*
(0.351) (0.363) (3.667) (7.365)
Protocol D -0.355 -0.285 -4.805 -9.800
(0.343) (0.372) (3.765) (7.449)
Trial -0.207* -0.175 0.959 1.706
(0.123) (0.127) (1.203) (1.652)
dt−1i = 325 2.615*** 3.594*** -18.47*** -24.20***
(0.267) (0.328) (2.363) (3.147)
325 < dt−1i ≤ 350 0.226 0.790*** -17.10*** -22.43***
(0.302) (0.276) (2.830) (6.105)
5→3 -0.341 -0.624** -3.241 -1.538
(0.288) (0.301) (3.029) (6.028)
Round -0.0689 0.213** -1.467 -1.869
(0.0934) (0.0995) (0.917) (1.196)
Constant -1.203** -1.955*** 61.73*** 73.15***
(0.518) (0.542) (5.184) (7.940)
Observations 847 847 555 582
Number of subjects 141 141 117 110
Number of groups 36 36 36 36
Notes: Each observation is the outcome per period per subject. For Protocol S, we
exclude observations of pairs having finished bargaining. The regressions are three-level
mixed models with random intercepts at both the session and the subject-within-session
levels. The dependent variable “No concession” = 1 if dti = d
t−1
i , otherwise 0. The
dummy variable “dt−1i = 325” [“325 < d
t−1
i ≤ 350”] = 1 if the player demanded 325
points [between 326 and 350 points] in the previous trial. The dummy variable “5→3” is
equal to 1 if T = 5 in the first two rounds, otherwise 0. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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minimum concessions 25 is 43.3%. Since the minimum concession is modal (see Figure
E.2 of online appendix), 25 points seems to be a binding constraint as planned.21
The third and fourth columns of Table 4 give the linear regression results of con-
cession size when conceding. We use the same dependent variables with the logistic
regressions on “no concession”. The dummy variable T = 5 is significantly negative for
both Regressions (3) and (4), hence players of any conflict payoff concede fewer amounts
when T = 5.
Result 5: The increase in time horizon makes both types of players concede smaller
amounts.
To summarize Results 4 and 5, the longer time horizon makes players more likely to
stop conceding and, if they concede, to do so by smaller amounts. Another finding is
that both players tend to reduce concession size when their demand levels are between
325 and 350 points. The order of play is significant only for “no concession” and high
conflict payoff.
Finally we checked the demand levels of both conflict payoffs. The first and second
columns of Table 5 report the regression results of demand level, number of trials, a
dummy for time horizon (T = 5), dummies for protocols P and D, interactions of these
variables, order of play, and round number for each type of player. For protocol S, we
use the data of only players who are still in the bargaining process. Figure E.4 of online
appendix contains the corresponding diagrams. We find that
(a) low conflict payoff players increase their initial demands when horizon T is larger
as shown by the significantly positive dummy variable T = 5 for players with low
conflict payoff;
(b) less concessions when time horizon T is large as implied by the significantly positive
coefficient for the interaction between number of trials and time horizon;
(c) for high conflict payoff players, the initial level of demand is higher when players
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can see the demand levels of the opponent, although the concession size in the sub-
sequent trials is larger, as implied by the significantly positive dummy for protocol
D and the significantly negative interaction between number of trials and protocol
D;
(d) for low conflict payoff players, concession size is larger when the players only know
that they are still bargaining as shown by the significantly positive interaction
between number of trials and protocol P;
(e) high conflict payoff players increase their demand with experience as the signifi-
cantly positive round variable indicates.
Finding (b), that concession size is smaller for T = 5, can be attributed to Results 4 and
5. According to finding (c), high conflict payoff players increase their initial demand by
26.31 − 5.592 ≈ 20.72, but concede approximately 5.59 more in each trial, hence they
reach almost the same demand level as players in the other protocols at the 5th trial.
Our prior was that players in protocol D are more likely to experience emotional
arousal as the game unfolds, that may cause higher demand or lower concession levels.
If this were true, one should observe no increase in the initial demand levels and smaller
concession sizes in subsequent trials. This pattern is rather different to what is actually
observed. So emotions did not play a significant role.
Our results are more in line with the hypothesis that participants use their initial
demand to influence the other player’s behavior, i.e. that demand levels are signaling
toughness in bargaining. The evidence from psychology studies, e.g. Poucke and Buelens
(2002), is that players who begin bargaining with high demands are more likely to
end up with a higher payoff. This is also known in psychology as anchoring effect
(e.g. Kahneman, 1992). We regressed final payoff for initial demands when reaching
an agreement in the 2nd or later trial and found a significant and positive correlation
between the two variables (see the third and fourth columns of Table 5).
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Table 5: Linear regressions on demand level and earnings when agreed at trial t > 1
Regression (5) (6) (7) (8)
Demand dti Agreed payoff | t > 1
Variables ci = 25 ci = 175 ci = 25 ci = 175
T = 5 11.65*** -2.459 1.757 8.935***
(4.203) (5.436) (2.890) (3.069)
Protocol P -0.984 -0.0464 -9.127* 1.895
(7.788) (11.19) (5.215) (3.942)
Protocol D 0.803 26.31** -0.182 5.557
(7.710) (11.11) (5.421) (4.168)
Trial -22.58*** -31.57***
(2.220) (2.913)
(T = 5) × Trial 6.305*** 13.86***
(2.078) (2.688)
Protocol P × Trial -4.530** 0.173
(2.206) (2.869)
Protocol D × Trial -1.901 -5.592**
(2.094) (2.764)
1st trial own demand (d1i ) 0.183*** 0.117***
(0.0359) (0.0234)
1st trial opponent demand (d1−i) -0.163*** -0.172***
(0.0227) (0.0309)
5→3 5.506 3.695 7.719* -1.894
(5.348) (7.993) (4.331) (3.297)
Round 1.608* 4.898*** 0.492 2.837**
(0.836) (1.078) (1.265) (1.358)
Constant 357.6*** 382.6*** 299.9*** 330.9***
(7.007) (9.910) (17.67) (16.43)
Observations 1,423 1,423 355 355
Number of subjects 144 144 136 135
Number of groups 36 36 36 36
Notes: See the notes of Table 4 for the specification of the regression models.
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We also checked the difference in the demand levels between players with the high
and low conflict payoffs (see Table E.3 of online appendix). In protocol D, the difference
increases by 26.89 as the high conflict payoff type increases the demand level.
Finding (d), that the amount of concession is larger for low conflict payoff players in
protocol P rather than protocol S, can be attributed to less chances of “no concession”,
Finding (a) of Regression (1): Again the evidence contradicts our conjecture that players
being aware of not yet having agreed are more emotionally aroused.
Nevertheless, the outlined differences in demand levels between 3 protocols are too
minor to impact on frequency of conflict, efficiency or (in)equal if agreements (see Result
1).
5.3 Demand levels when bargaining ends
As a further test for different causes of conflict, we compare between protocols distri-
butions of last relevant demands by bargaining pairs which failed to agree. Using the
Kruskal-Wallis test, as for agreements, distributions of last conflict demands do not differ
significantly between protocols. Finally, a categorization of agreements into one of the
categories, generous, equal split, in-between, mid-point, cheeky and selfish; also does not
reveal any differences between protocols, except that in D high conflict types are initially
reluctant to go for the equal split. More specifically, denoting the relevant demand of
a high- and low type of an agreeing pair by d25 and d175 respectively, categories are
defined as follows: generous: d25 < 250, d175 < 325; mid-point: d25 = 250, d175 = 400;
in-between: 250 < d25 < 325, 325 < d175 < 400; equal split: d25 = d175 = 325; cheeky:
325 < d25 < 475, 400 < d175 < 625; selfish: d25 ≥ 475, d175 ≥ 625. Categorization is
performed individually. If we depict agreement payoffs in the plane by points (di, dj),
where i, j are defined by conflict payoffs ci = 25 and cj = 175, then 79% of all agree-
ments lie in the triangular region between mid-point (250, 400), equal split (325, 325),
and (250, 325), and 58% of all agreements grant the low type exactly 325 and 75% give
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one party exactly 325. All agreements yield each party at least its conflict payoff, and
there is no conflict in line with a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Result 6: In spite of the considerable asymmetry in conflict payoffs equal payoff
shares, i.e. payoffs with 325 for at least one party, are observed very often (in 75% of all
agreements).
5.4 Alternation
The experimental protocols do not impose alternation but participants may voluntarily
try to take turns in conceding. To explore this we introduce a weak measure of intended
alternation which is applicable to all protocols: define a concession of participant i at trial
t, denoted by kti , as the difference in demands between two trials, and the first concession
as the difference between the initially available surplus and the first submitted demand.
More specifically, k1i = 650− cj − d1i for i 6= j and kti = dt−1i − dti for t > 1. We focus on
cases with at least three demands and speak of an intended alternation if, for example
k1 ≤ k2 ≥ k3 ≤ k4 or k1 ≥ k2 ≤ k3 ≥ k4 with at least two consecutive relations being
strict. Thus, for example k1 = k2 = k3 > k4 = k5 is not considered as an intended
alternation, whereas k1 = k2 < k3 > k4 = k5 is.
Table 6 reports the share of observations satisfying this alternation condition, for
all cases with at least three demands, by protocol and deadline T . Despite the measure
being fairly weak, only between 4.17% and 46.25% of cases indicate intended alternation.
In the majority of all cases we can not confirm intended alternation.
Table 6: Share of intended alternation
Protocol T = 3 T = 5
S 23.44% 4.17%
P 46.25% 16.33%
D 31.15% 18.18%
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6 Conclusions
Quite surprisingly, we are unable to find any effects of dynamic interaction on concession
bargaining and its outcomes. This holds irrespective of whether we compare two different
representations of the same game (S vs. P) or the more complex game (D), which
allows truly dynamic and richer interaction. This finding confirms other null results
of protocol on bargaining behavior (see, for example, Brandts and Charness, 2011, or
the final section of Fischer and Gu¨th, 2012). Concluding that behavior in the dynamic
game is indistinguishable from the other protocols may seem comforting for bargaining
theory as (strict) equilibrium theory makes the same broad (set) predictions, irrespective
of protocol.
We observe instead the effect of time horizon on concession-making. A longer time
horizon increases the frequency of no concession and decreases the size of concessions
even when players concede. This result is consistent with the evidence from previous
studies (see e.g. the meta-analysis by Stuhlmacher et al., 1998) that a shorter time
horizon enhance concession-making and cooperation. As for the final outcome, however,
we find the more conflict in case of the longer time horizon, which is the opposite finding
of Karago¨zog˘lu and Kocher (2015) in their unstructured bargaining experiment. The
difference between their results and ours can be ascribed to the relatively long time
horizon in Karago¨zog˘lu and Kocher, and to the absence of the rule of ending the game
in case of no concession by either parties.
We confirm the strong focus of behavior on equal payoff shares (see the early contri-
butions by Homans, 1961, and for later more detailed discussion of equity theory Carrell
and Dittrich, 1978). Whereas equity theory argues that fairness is focal and desirable,
also in economics, one can allow for trade-off relationships between equity and own
monetary concerns (see Kagel and Levin, 2009, for a recent review). This explains why
aiming at the split-the difference solution or something nearby appears to be the best
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predictor of behavior irrespective of protocol. At the same time, however, we observe a
significant number of pairs ending up with conflicts or an inefficient agreement. This can
be theoretically explained as resulting from mixed strategy equilibrium play22. Mixed
strategy equilibria are clearly payoff dominated by and less focal than strict equilibria
such as equal surplus or payoff sharing23.
Finally, while alternation has great appeal and is often seen a natural feature of
negotiations, our data do not confirm this. In spite of some cases of intended alternation,
this only covers a fairly small share of observations. In our positional and dynamic
protocols these might be due to dynamically reacting to the other’s behavior.
The invariance bargaining protocol is comforting for the institutional design of bar-
gaining and negotiation rules. Furthermore, it would be seen as good news that outcomes
do not improve by longer bargaining procedures and that, the contrary, a longer time
horizon increases conflict due to the increasing stubbornness of the stronger party. In
view of our findings we do not have to return to bazar-like negotiations rules even when
modern information technology would allow to apply them in the global economy. There-
fore, the fact that real world bargaining is often very time consuming may be due to
incomplete information about the other party’s bargaining position or due to ritually
displaying toughness, e.g. by conceding minimally or not at all (hoping the other party
will concede).
Notes
1. We abstract from endogenous threats which, according to Nash (1953), are strategically chosen before
trying to reach an agreement, an at least debatable timing assumption. This is done by assuming
exogenously given conflict payoffs as in Nash (1950).
2. In case of complete information actually an agreement is reached immediately, i.e. for alternating to be
an equilibrium outcome one has to refer to incomplete information bargaining (see Rubenstein, 1985,
and closer to our setup with simultaneous demands Harsanyi and Selten, 1972).
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3. Our approach is similar to the bargaining study of Harsanyi and Selten (1972), who generalize the Nash
bargaining solution to situations with incomplete information.
4. Anticonflicts are agreements whose demands do not add up to what is available.
5. In line with much of the literature but contrary to ultimatum bargaining, all experimental protocols
allow for anti-conflict in the sense of agreements on sharing less than is available.
6. Harsanyi and Selten (1972) and Rubinstein (1985) are pioneering studies of incomplete information
bargaining.
7. In case of agreement the proposer earns the pie size minus the accepted offer to the responder what
excludes anticonflict agreements which are actually observed in all our three protocols.
8. Fischer et al. (2006) connect the two games as border cases of a one-parameter game class and explore
game-theoretically and experimentally what happens when this parameter changes.
9. For every τ the conceding player may be the same, another one, or both.
10. By “within subjects” we mean that every participant experienced both conditions, T = 3 and T = 5.
“Between subjects” implies that every participant only played one of the three protocols.
11. A learning study would require many more repetitions of the various games, that might be the focus of
future research.
12. No one interacted with anyone more than once.
13. The exchange rate was 1 point = 0.01e.
14. Field of studies from the following areas: 14.9% social sciences, 13.5% Business, 11.8% Humanities,
11.5% Teaching studies, 9.4% natural sciences, 7.3% Human Health, 6.3% Law, 5.6% engineering, 9.7%
other, remainder unreported.
15. Socio-demographic characteristics: length of studies, income, and experience with laboratory experi-
ments. Unfortunately we only have partial observations since answering such questions is voluntary.
16. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the use of the multiple-comparison test.
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17. When both parties do not concede in the last trial, we categorize the case as conflict due to no concession.
18. Figure E.3 of the online appendix is the same diagram with non-cumulative incidence over trial.
19. We tried non-parametric analysis as well (see Table E.2 of the online appendix), with evidence only for
high conflict types that the longer time horizon renders conceding less likely. This could be due to the
weaker statistical power.
20. We select this interval as the mean demand level when the high conflict payoff player makes no concession
is approximately 350 (see Table E.2 of the online appendix).
21. As indicated before we wanted to rule out minor (“peanut”) concessions in favor of substantial sacrifices,
especially when not only conceding once before agreeing.
22. Note, however, that mixed strategies might involve mixing on various stages of concession-making, that
renders the game more complex and cognitively demanding.
23. This is in line with equilibrium selection theories (see Nash, 1950, 1953 and Harsanyi and Selten, 1972)
which consider strict equilibria as initial candidates when resolving strategic uncertainty.
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A Experimental instructions
This section gives the experimental instructions translated from [name of language removed]
Paragraphs which differed between protocols and T are indicated accordingly.
General Instructions
Note: In the interest of a concise text we exclusively use the masculine gender despite describing
gender-free aspects.
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this experiment.
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your
hand and one of us will come to help.
Instructions are identical for all participants. The experiment consists of four rounds. Rounds
1 and 2 are identical to each other, as are rounds 3 and 4. You will first receive instructions for
rounds 1 and 2 only. In every round you can earn money. How much money you earn depends
on your own decisions, decisions made by other participants and a move of chance.
Your total income is the sum of earnings for all rounds. In the experiment, money will be
denoted in “points”. Each point will be worth e 0.01. In addition, you will be paid a show-up
fee of e 2.50 for having shown up on time plus e 2.50 for participation. You will receive your
entire earnings at the end of the experiment anonymously in cash.
At the beginning of the experiment a move of chance will assign one of two roles – A and B –
to you. You will interact in this role during the entire experiment. One half of participants will
decide in role A and the other half will decide in role B.
In every round one participant A interacts with one participant B. The combination of partici-
pants A and B changes at every round, such that no one interacts with someone else more than
once.
1
Instructions for rounds 1 and 2
Decisions in each round
Participants A and B can allocate 650 points between each other. To do so, both participants
–A and B –must indicate how many points they claim for themselves. Whenever the sum of
points claimed by A and B is smaller or equal to 650, we speak of an AGREEMENT. If A and
B should not find an agreement at the end of a round, we speak of a disagreement.
How to state a claim
Each round consists of at most 3[5] trials. At each trial both participants can state a claim
of points to the other participant. This is done by entering the claimed number of points into
the appropriate field and by clicking the button “confirm”. Before confirming your entry you
can change your decision as often as you wish, but once you have confirmed it your entry is
binding.
Both participants submit their claims simultaneously not knowing how many points the other
participant claims. Once both have entered and confirmed their claims, the trial ends. Please
note that in comparison to the previous trial, you cannot increase your claim. You can either
leave your claim unchanged or decrease it by at least 25 points.
End of a round and your payment
If both participants found an AGREEMENT at the end of the last trial, then each obtains the
number of points he claimed. If both found an agreement before the last trial, then the round
ends with this trial and each obtains the number of points he claimed.
If at the end of the last trial both participants remain in DISAGREEMENT, then participant
A obtains 25 points and participant B obtains 175 points.
If at any trial after the first one, none of the two participants reduces his claim in comparison
to the previous trial, then the interaction ends with this trial. Participant A then obtains 25
and participant B 175 points.
At the end of each trial
Protocol S: After each trial, participants will neither be informed about how much the other
participant claimed, nor whether the round already ended. Only after both participants have
submitted their claims FOR ALL TRIALS, each participant will be informed which trial was
decisive and how many points the other participant claimed in all trials up to the decisive
one.
Protocol P: After each trial, participants will not be informed about how much the other par-
ticipant claimed. They will only be informed about whether there will be another trial. Only
after both participants have submitted their claims FOR ALL POSSIBLE TRIALS up to the
decisive one, each participant will be informed how many points the other participant claimed
in all relevant trials.
Protocol D: After each trial, participants will be informed about how many points the other
participant claimed and whether there will be another trial before the end of the round.
Instructions for rounds 3 and 4
Decisions in each round
The implementation of rounds 3 and 4 is identical to that of rounds 1 and 2 except for the
maximal number of trials which changes from 3[5] to 5[3].
2
B Control questions
The control questions were implemented and zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants had to
indicate whether a statement was true or false. Whenever a statement was false, all were given
the corrected statement.
Please indicate whether the following statements are TRUE or FALSE:
1. In the first round, A and B are given a maximum of 3 [5] trials to allocate 650 points
between each other.
• If answer was “TRUE”: This is the correct answer.
• If answer was “FALSE”: Your answer is wrong.
2. If in the first trial A and B altogether claim 500 points then the interaction ends and each
participant obtains the amount he claimed.
• If answer was “TRUE”: This is the correct answer.
• If answer was “FALSE”: Your answer is wrong.
3. If at the first trial A and B altogether claim 700 points then the interaction ends and each
participant obtains the amount he claimed.
• If answer was “TRUE”: This is wrong. If at any trial prior to the final trial, A and
B altogether claim 700 points then there is another trial.
• If answer was “FALSE”: This is the correct answer.
4. If at the final trial A and B altogether claim 700 points then each participant obtains the
amount he claimed.
• If answer was “TRUE”: This is wrong. If at the final trial A and B altogether claim
700 points then the round ends in disagreement. Participant A receives 25 points
and B obtains 175 points.
• If answer was “FALSE”: This is the correct answer.
5. If at a trial after the first one and before the third [fifth], both participants do not reduce
their claim in comparison to the previous trial, then the round continues with another
trial.
• If answer was “TRUE”: This is wrong. If at any trial after the first one both partic-
ipants do not reduce their claim in comparison to the previous trial, then the round
ends in disagreement with A receiving 25 points and B obtaining 175.
• If answer was “FALSE”: This is the correct answer.
C Results of control questions
Table C.1 reports the rate of correct answers for each control question. The rate for question
5 is significantly low. This implies that, while reading instructions, subjects had difficulty in
understanding the rule of early conflict due to no concessions.
Hence we run the logistic regressions on no concessions and the answer to question 5 in order to
check whether subjects did not understand the rule even after completing the control questions.
We have two opposing hypothesis:
3
Table C.1: Rate of correct answers
Q.1 89.9%
Q.2 74.3%
Q.3 97.6%
Q.4 96.2%
Q.5 55.2%
Hypothesis C.1: A subject, who answers Q.5 incorrectly, is more likely to refuse conceding;
Hypothesis C.2: A subject, who answers Q.5 incorrectly, is less likely to refuse conceding;
As shown in Section B, when subjects answer control questions incorrectly, they will see the
feedback that reminds them the rule of our experiment again. Hence, we assume that all
subjects, whether they answer the question correctly or incorrectly, understand the rule by the
time the game begins.
Hypothesis C.1 is the case where subjects, whose answers to Q.5 are wrong, see the feedback,
but they still do not understand the rule. Hypothesis C.2 considers another possibility that
subjects, who do not understand the rule, answer question 5 at random. If their answers
happen to be incorrect, then they see the feedback, otherwise they miss the opportunity to
learn the rule again. Thus, subjects with wrong answers eventually the rule better. In either
case, not realizing the risk of the early break ups may make subjects refuse to concede more
often.
Table C.2 reports the results of logistic regressions on no concession, which correspond to
Regressions (1) and (2) of the main text. We have added a new dummy variable for subjects,
who answer question 5 wrongly. The variable is insignificant for both types of players, hence
we reject hypothesis C.1 and C.2.
Finally, we also checked if players less likely to refuse concession if they experience early breakups
(conflict before reaching the final trail T ) in previous rounds. The dummy variable of the
experience of disagreement before reaching the final trial T in any previous rounds is introduced
in the third and fourth columns of Table C.2. If the coefficient is negative, there is a possibility
that there are players, who stop no concession because they understand the rule of the early
breakups by reading the instructions not by reading the instructions but by experiencing it in
the actual game. Of course, there can be an alternative explanation for the negative coefficient:
subjects learn how their opponents are stubborn too from the experience of early breakups,
then they become less likely to refuse concessions in the next round onwards. Nevertheless,
Regressions (C.3) and (C.4) shows that the coefficients are negative but not significant, so we
do not find the evidence.
D Screenshots of the experiment
This section contains the screenshots of three protocols:
• Figure D.1 is the dynamic protocol. When both parties i = 1, 2 simultaneously choose
dti, both i know all previous demands by other party d
s−i, s < t. The information is
provided in the bottom table. In the middle of the screen, the blue rectangular indicates
the player’s own demand in the current trial. The pale blue is the level of concession from
the last trial. The pale red rectangular is the demand by the other player in the last trial.
• Figure D.2 is the positional order protocol. When both parties i = 1, 2 simultaneously
choose dti, both i are aware of d
s
1+d
s
2 > 650 for all previous proposals, s < t. But both i do
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Table C.2: Logistic regressions on no concession
Regression (C.1) (C.2) (C.3) (C.4)
No concession No concession
Variables ci = 25 ci = 175 ci = 25 ci = 175
T = 5 0.737*** 0.775*** 0.725*** 0.757***
(0.218) (0.229) (0.221) (0.227)
Protocol P -0.885** -0.256 -0.902** -0.305
(0.360) (0.364) (0.375) (0.366)
Protocol D -0.382 -0.309 -0.411 -0.353
(0.348) (0.373) (0.366) (0.375)
Trial -0.200 -0.191 -0.213* -0.182
(0.123) (0.130) (0.125) (0.129)
dt−1i = 325 2.527*** 3.653*** 2.548*** 3.655***
(0.291) (0.346) (0.298) (0.346)
325 < dt−1i ≤ 350 -0.00374 0.660** -0.0233 0.671**
(0.306) (0.268) (0.311) (0.267)
5→3 -0.337 -0.647** -0.289 -0.747**
(0.290) (0.302) (0.302) (0.297)
Round -0.0647 0.199**
(0.0938) (0.0991)
Wrong answer to Q. 5 0.161 0.177
(0.294) (0.300)
Experience of early breakups -0.681* -0.0573
(0.380) (0.364)
Constant -1.186** -2.026*** -1.176** -1.364***
(0.543) (0.556) (0.479) (0.452)
Observations 847 847 847 847
Number of subjects 141 141 141 141
Number of groups 36 36 36 36
Notes: See the notes of Table 4 of the main text for the specification of the regression models.
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not know all previous demands by other party ds−i, s < t. Thus the pale red rectangular
is hidden.
• Figure D.3 is the static protocol. When both parties i = 1, 2 simultaneously choose dti,
both i know neither if they are yet to reach an agreement nor all previous demands by
other party.
The feedback screen at the end of bargain is the same for all three protocols (see Figure
D.4).
Figure D.1: Screenshot of the dynamic protocol
6
Figure D.2: Screenshot of the positional order protocol
Figure D.3: Screenshot of the static protocol
7
Figure D.4: Screenshot of feedback after bargaining
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Figure E.1: Agreement ratio, efficiency and inequality by time horizon T
Notes: Each observation is the mean value at the group level.
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Notes: For Protocol S, we exclude the observations of pairs that have finished bargaining.
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Table E.1: Regressions on agreement, efficiency and inequality
Regression (E.1) (E.2) (E.3) (E.4) (E.5) (E.6) (E.7) (E.8) (E.9)
Agreement Efficiency | Agreement Inequality | Agreement
Variables T = 3 T = 5 Combined T = 3 T = 5 Combined T = 3 T = 5 Combined
Protocol P -0.487 0.647 0.237 -0.00346 -0.00636 -0.00461 9.195 23.35 16.70*
(0.877) (0.501) (0.402) (0.00745) (0.00851) (0.00572) (9.938) (15.46) (8.759)
Protocol D -0.192 -0.356 -0.319 0.00899 -0.00694 0.00168 8.015 14.85 10.34
(0.906) (0.449) (0.380) (0.00743) (0.00881) (0.00581) (9.928) (15.90) (8.865)
T = 5 -0.974*** 0.00513 -0.629
(0.276) (0.00439) (5.540)
5→3 -0.938 0.627 0.136 -0.000794 -0.0202 -0.000538 11.03 -11.77 -8.633
(1.256) (0.769) (0.328) (0.0136) (0.0139) (0.00472) (14.33) (19.49) (7.207)
Round 0.258 0.0542 -0.139 0.00701 -0.00269 0.00591*** -3.918 5.379 4.634*
(0.511) (0.329) (0.121) (0.00609) (0.00587) (0.00195) (5.899) (7.201) (2.455)
Constant 3.965*** 1.271 3.031*** 0.953*** 0.998*** 0.958*** 16.83 -1.469 2.354
(1.317) (1.219) (0.531) (0.0110) (0.0220) (0.00699) (12.00) (28.57) (9.691)
Observations 288 288 576 262 233 495 262 233 495
Number of subjects 144 144 144 139 135 143 139 135 143
Number of groups 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Notes: Each observation is the outcome per period per subject with the high conflict payoff. The regressions are three-level mixed models with
random intercepts at both the session and the subject-within-session levels. Agreement is regressed with a logit model. Efficiency and inequality
are regressed with linear models. The dummy variable “5→3” = 1 if T = 5 in the first two rounds, otherwise 0. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table E.2: Sign-rank tests on no concession rate and no concession demand level by time horizon T
No Concession Rate No Concession Demand Level
Conflict Mean p-value Mean (N) p-value
Payoff Protocol T = 3 T = 5 (N) signrank T = 3 T = 5 T = 3 T = 5 signrank
25
S 0.3511 0.3775 (12) 0.8139 326.4 326.2 (12) (12) 0.8427
P 0.2233 0.3179 (12) 0.3264 325.2 335.7 (10) (12) 0.1322
D 0.3932 0.4732 (12) 0.3465 326.9 329.0 (12) (12) 1.0000
Combined 0.3225 0.3895 (36) 0.1717 326.2 330.3 (34) (36) 0.3841
175
S 0.2520 0.4356 (12) 0.0121 349.6 348.4 (11) (12) 0.3978
P 0.3073 0.3699 (12) 0.2393 357.5 354.4 (12) (12) 0.7231
D 0.2494 0.3706 (12) 0.0309 344.7 374.2 (11) (11) 0.0827
Combined 0.2696 0.3921 (36) 0.0006 350.8 358.6 (34) (35) 0.1855
Notes: “No concession rate” means the probability that a player refuses to concede in a trial t > 1. p-values are two-sided. Each observation is at
the mean at the group level.12
Table E.3: Linear regression on the difference in the demand levels between players with the
high and low conflict payoffs
Regression (E.10)
Variables dt175 − dt25
T = 3 17.20**
(7.781)
Protocol P 5.690
(13.60)
Protocol D 26.89**
(13.46)
Trial -2.205
(2.901)
(T = 3) × Trial -10.42***
(3.845)
Protocol P × Trial 0.00579
(4.095)
Protocol D × Trial -4.050
(3.941)
5→3 -0.974
(9.116)
Round 3.972**
(1.542)
Constant 9.206
(11.65)
Observations 1,423
Number of subjects 144
Number of groups 36
Notes: Each observation is the decision per trial per subjectwith the high conflict payoff. For
Protocol S, we exclude the observations of pairs that have finished bargaining. The regressions
are three-level mixed models with random intercepts at both the session and the subject-within-
session levels. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
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